This case raises the question of whether the consent of defence counsel to a hearing outside the time limit of Article III of the Intergovernmental Agreement on Detainees preclude the application for release, since the trial did not occur within that time. The accused was then convicted of second degree murder and first degree theft following a jury trial. On appeal, the accused argued that the court erred in refusing to dismiss the charge because of the lack of a timely trial under the IAD. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, upheld the court`s decision. 244 App. Div. 2d 927, 668 N. Y. S.
2d 126 (1997). However, the New York Court of Appeals set aside the dismissal of the charge against the defendant and ordered the charge to be dismissed; The agreement of defence counsel at a later date did not waive the prompt procedural rights of interviewees under the IAD. 92 N. Y. 2d 406, 704 N. E. 2d 542 (1998). We granted certiorari. 526 U.S. – (1999). (3) If we conclude that it is possible to waive the objection to a certain delay, we are aware that the sending state may have other interests than the prisoner and the host state. This case contains no objections from the State of origin and we do not deal with the recourse that the sending state might have under the IAD if the host state and the prisoner accepted an excessive delay and accepted the court.
See Article V, point e) (As fast as the Date of the Convention of Prisoners to the Sending State, in accordance with the objectives of this agreement is back. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is a pact between 48 states, the United States and the District of Columbia to determine procedures for settling a state`s outstanding charges against a prisoner in another state. See N. Y. Crim. Proc. Act 580.20 (McKinney 1995); 18 U.S.C. App. 11A U.L. A.
48 (list of jurisdictions). As an intermediary sanctioned by Congress, compact within the compact clause of the U.S. Constitution, art. I, 10, C. 3, the IAD is a federal law subject to federal construction. Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 442 (1981). 1. At the hearing, it was suggested that the consent of a court to a date of judgment outside the authorized period may itself be considered a necessary or appropriate continuation for a good reason demonstrated by an open court.
While an agreed trial date sometimes merits this description, it is far from clear that it still does or does so here. As we find an exception, we do not take into account the circumstances in which an agreed delay could be in the destination. What is sufficient to waive depends on the nature of the right at issue. Whether the defendant must be personally involved in the waiver declaration; Whether certain procedures are necessary for the waiver; And if the choice of the defendants must be particularly informed or voluntary, it all depends on the right at stake. United States vs.